How The Saudi Pharmaceutical Industry could be Shaped by the experiences of Regulating Antitrust- Intellectual Property in the United States from 1970 through the Present
I. The History of the Development of Antitrust Regulations in the United States
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=9324c489-94fe-4bb0-a499-8a8817794e44
a. 1960’s Realization of the Need for Intellectual Property Guidelines
b. Issuance of “The Nine no-no’s in 1970
(1-tying the purchase of unpatented materials as a condition of the license;
2-requiring a licensee to assign back subsequent patents;
3-restricting the resale right of a product’s purchasers;
4-restricting a licensee’s ability to deal in products outside the scope of the patent;
5-prohibiting a licensor from granting further licenses;
6-requiring mandatory package licensing;
7-requiring, as a condition of the license, royalties not reasonably related to the licensee’s sales of products covered by the patent;
8-restricting a licensee’s use of a product made by a patented process; and
9-setting minimum resale price provisions for licensed products.16)
c. Court Cases Showing Applying “Nine no-no’s Led to economically irrational results”
(Examples Cases)
d. 1981 “Deputy Assistant Attorney General declared that the DOJ would renounce its strict approach”
e. 1995 “DOJ and FTC jointly issued the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (“Guidelines”)”
(for the purpose of antitrust analysis, conduct involving intellectual
1-property is evaluated no differently than conduct involving other forms of property;
2-intellectual property does not presumptively confer market power in the antitrust context; and
3-intellectual property licensing is generally procompetitive behavior.25)
f. 2007 “a joint DOJ and FTC report, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, reaffirmed that the federal antitrust agencies were to continue analyzing patent licensing practices according to the Guidelines”
g. 2012 “then-Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (“DOJ”) Joseph Wayland gave a speech on the increasing importance of curtailing anticompetitive uses of patent rights in order to protect today’s innovation-driven economy”
II. The State of IP- Antitrust in Saudi Arabia
( Some basics from :
http://www.mci.gov.sa/en/LawsRegulations/SystemsAndRegulations/IntellectualPropertySystem/Pages/default.aspx
http://mci.gov.sa/en/LawsRegulations/SystemsAndRegulations/CompetitionSystem/Pages/26-3.aspx
III. Evolution of Intellectual Property Protections in The Pharmaceutical Industry in Saudi Arabia
“The pharmaceutical market in Saudi Arabia is the largest in the Middle East. It represents 65% of the GCC market. The outlook for growth for the next 10 years, in the Saudi Arabia pharmaceutical market is very positive. The total pharmaceutical market is worth USD 6.7 billion. The Saudi pharmaceutical market is set to achieve a steady growth with a compound average growth rate of 8.7% until 2018.”
http://www.marcopolis.net/top-pharmaceutical-companies-in-saudi-arabia.htm
IV. What Saudi Minatory of Trade Can Learn from The United States Department of Justice Experiences with Regard to Strictness of Antitrust-IP Guidelines
V. Conclusion
Additional Resources:
http://www.cptech.org/cm/ninenonos.html
http://www.saudi-pharma.net/spi2/
If you want to include some of the economic literature that led to the approach in the Joint Agencies’ 1995 guidelines, see the economics section in GAI’s recent comment at http://gai.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/GAI-Comment_DOJ-FTC-Updated-IP-Guidelines_9-19-16_FINAL.pdf
the goals of antitrust, which may be helpful to you for your paper.
Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, “The Goals of Antitrust,” 81 Fordham Law
Review 2405 (2013).
Kenneth Heyer, “Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork,” 57 Journal of
Law & Economics S19 (2014).
Douglas H. Ginsburg, “Judge Bork, Consumer Welfare, and Antitrust Law,” 31 Harvard
Journal of Law and Public Policy 449 (2008).
Jonathan M. Jacobson, “Another Take on the Relevant Welfare Standard for Antitrust,”
presented at the Chair’s Showcase: Rethinking Antitrust Economics for the 21st Century,
ABA Spring Meetings (April 16, 2015).
